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ABSTRACT 
During the Cold War, U.S. foreign aid was mainly used to fight against the potential Soviet 
military threat and to support allies. Containing Communism was the non-negotiable goal in 
U.S. foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War and the rising force of globalization, aid-
providing developed countries in the West, including the United States, emphasized political 
conditionality attached to aid in order to encourage political reforms, such as democratic 
political process and securing human rights, in aid-recipient developing countries. This study 
uses pooled cross-sectional time series data covering 112 countries for the post-Cold War 
years of 1990-2009 to examine the effects of U.S. foreign aid allocation on human rights, 
especially physical integrity rights. The findings suggest that U.S. foreign aid [economic, 
military, and total aid] did have an impact on a government’s respect for human rights in 
recipient countries, but that the association was negative: an increase in foreign aid from the 
United States is associated with less protection of human rights. Even though the good will of 
the chief administrators to promote human rights was explicit, implementations to achieve 
such a goal through foreign aid seem to fall far short of their promises. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States government has a variety of tools to promote its human rights 
policy. Three main options among these are quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, and the 
use of foreign aid (Apodaca 2006). Quiet diplomacy aims to maintain “friendly relations” 
with allies by creating conditions in which parties feel comfortable discussing, evaluating, 
and responding to problems in a calm way. By using quiet diplomacy, the U.S. government 
has the advantage of not publicly embarrassing human-rights-abusing countries; however, 
silence often conceals the government’s apathy and neglect of such issues (Apodaca 2006).  
Public condemnation, on the other hand, refers to the open criticism of a country’s 
human rights practices, and raises the attention of the media and the public. One of the most 
important U.S. public diplomacy instruments is the Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices – “a detailed chronicle of documented torture, state-sanctioned killings, censorship 
and other forms of political repression committed by foreign governments on their own 
citizens” (Hoffman 2011, 21).  The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 
1974 mandate the Secretary of State to submit to Congress the Country Reports about the 
condition of human rights in U.S.-aid-recipient countries and, also, in all countries that are 
members of the United Nations. While bringing the matter to the attention of the media and 
the public, public diplomacy can be successful if a human-rights victim is well-known. 
However, the majority of human-rights victims are unknown to the media and the public, 
thus often neglected (Apodaca 2006). 
“U.S. human rights policy, however, assumes its most tangible consequence with the 
granting and restricting of economic and military foreign assistance” (Apodaca 2006, 18). 
Studies indicate that the denial of foreign aid is one of the most effective tools in human 
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rights policy not only because the target country responds to the threat, but also because, with 
the threat of aid termination, “the U.S. Congress can prod the White House into action on 
issues that it may be reluctant to address and send a strong signal to foreign governments 
about the seriousness with which the United States regards particular human rights issues” 
(Liang-Fenton 2004, 441). Therefore, the denial or restriction of U.S. foreign aid can be a 
valuable tool to promote international standards of human rights. 
Since the allocation of U.S. foreign aid is theoretically important in securing human 
rights protections, this study analyzes how U.S. foreign aid allocation affects human rights 
practices in developing countries during the post-Cold War era. To accomplish such goal, 
this research uses quantitative analyses with pooled cross-sectional time series data on 112 
developing countries from 1990 to 2009 and examines the relationship between U.S. foreign 
aid, the independent variable, and human rights, the dependent variable. Final results show 
that U.S. foreign aid [economic, military, and total aid] does have an impact on a 
government’s respect for human rights in recipient countries, but that the association is 
negative: an increase in foreign aid from the United States is associated with less protection 
of human rights.   
In the following section, Chapter 2, the existing literature on the relationship between 
U.S. foreign assistance and human rights is examined in detail and evaluated critically. With 
the insights from the literature review, Chapter 3 draws a theoretical framework for the study. 
In Chapter 4, an empirical model is developed including discussions of the primary and 
secondary hypotheses for the research and the control variables that affect the determinants 
of human rights. This chapter also discusses the methodology employed in the study. In 
Chapter 5, the designed model is tested and findings are presented and analyzed. Chapter 6 
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further discusses the empirical results by qualitatively examining a few cases. Finally, in 
Chapter 7, the major findings are reviewed, and suggestions for future studies are presented. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In considering the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and human rights, the 
published research is divided into two main motifs. The difference between the motifs is 
entirely derived from the direction of causal relationship between them. One direction, which 
most of the studies about the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and human rights have 
examined, is whether human rights conditions in potential recipient countries play an 
important role in determining U.S. foreign aid allocation. The other direction, which has 
received little attention from scholars, is whether U.S. foreign aid has a strong influence on 
human rights practices in recipient countries. 
 
2.1 HUMAN RIGHTS AS A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF 
U.S. FOREIGN AID ALLOCATION 
  In 1961, in an effort to improve how the U.S. government managed its foreign 
assistance programs as a means of foreign policy, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance 
Act (FAA), which separated military and non-military aid and resulted in the creation of the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). However, Congressional interest in 
the allocation of foreign aid was sparked in the early 1970s when Nixon and Kissinger 
resisted linking foreign assistance to human rights, preferring realpolitik policies (Callaway 
and Matthews 2008). As a consequence, gradual amendments to the 1961 FAA followed and 
were overtly designed to link U.S. foreign aid to human rights conditions in recipient 
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countries.
1
 That is to say, the U.S. Congress has mandated that foreign aid should be directed 
to regimes that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. This has become the 
prevalent rhetoric in U.S. foreign policy. 
In this stream, the majority of published research analyzes the role of human rights in 
the distribution of U.S. foreign assistance.
2
 As these studies elaborate more on the 
relationship between human rights and U.S. foreign policy practice, the effects of additional 
variables are probed in determining factors for U.S. foreign aid allocation. Table 1 shows a 
list of the factors proposed as potential determinants of U.S. foreign aid allocation, other than 
human rights. 
There are two characteristics in the majority of this literature examining the role of 
human rights in U.S. foreign aid allocation. First, some of these studies have focused on 
differences across presidential administrations (Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984; Carleton 
and Stohl 1985; Poe 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Callaway and 
Matthews 2008).
3
 However, findings from these studies show that there are no significant 
differences among the administrations although presidencies obviously vary in both 
ideological and foreign policy preferences. Apodaca and Stohl (1999), for example, who 
examined the relationship between the allocation of economic and military aid and also  
                                                 
1
 The 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 were designed to link 
foreign aid to human rights (see Carleton and Stohl 1985). 
2
 This motivational research has attracted the attention of numerous scholars. See Schoultz 1981; Stohl, 
Carleton and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and 
Mitchell 1988, 1989; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; 
Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Blanton 2000, 2005; Lai 2003; Neumayer 2003; Callaway and Matthews 2008; Gibler 
2008; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009. 
3
Apodaca and Stohl (1999) found that human rights considerations depended upon the administration and the 
type of aid. Among the listed studies, it is the only study that used Presidential Administration as an 
independent variable in a designed model. This is the reason that only the study by Apodaca and Stohl (1999) is 
listed in Table 1 under Presidential Administration, which is one of potential determinants of U.S. aid allocation. 
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Table 1. Factors Other Than Human Rights Potentially Determining U.S. Aid Allocation 
(adapted from Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009) 
Potential Determinant  
Level of economic development 
Apodaca & Stohl (1999); Blanton (1994); 
Cingranelli & Pasquarello (1985); Lai (2003); 
McKinlay & Little (1979); Meerinik, Krueger & 
Poe (1998); Poe (1992); Poe & Meernik (1995); 
Poe & Sirirangsi (1994); Gibler (2008); 
Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz (2009) 
Life expectancy Blanton (1994); Gibler (2008) 
Strategic importance/ power political 
interests/ security considerations 
Lai (2003); Lebovic (1988); McKinlay & Little 
(1977, 1979); Poe (1992); Poe & Sirirangsi 
(1994) 
Population 
Blanton (1994); Lai (2003); McKinlay and 
Richard (1977); Poe (1992); Poe & Sirirangsi 
(1994); Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz (2009) 
Leftist ideology Blanton (1994); Poe & Meernik (1995) 
Sharing borders with a communist state/ 
competition with communism 
McKinlay & Little (1977, 1979); Meernik, 
Krueger & Poe (1998); Poe & Meernik (1995); 
Poe & Sirirangsi (1994) 
Location within Central America Apodaca & Stohl (1999); Poe & Meernik (1995) 
Volume of trade with the USA 
Blanton (1994); Poe & Meernik (1995); Gibler 
(2008); Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz (2009) 
NATO membership Poe & Meernik (1995) 
Alliance with USA 
(Lebovic 1988); Meernik, Krueger & Poe 
(1998); Gibler (2008) 
Free market interests; business/ industry 
groups 
Meernik, Krueger & Poe (1998) 
Level of democracy 
Blanton (2000, 2005); Lai (2003); Meernik, 
Krueger & Poe (1998); Gibler (2008); Demirel-
Pegg & Moskowitz (2009) 
US military presence Apodaca & Stohl (1999); Poe (1991) 
Aid received in previous year 
Apodaca & Stohl (1999); Lai (2003); Gibler 
(2008); Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz (2009) 
Presidential administration Apodaca & Stohl (1999) 
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human rights performance in the presidential administrations from Jimmy Carter through Bill 
Clinton, concluded: 
Rhetoric notwithstanding, we found that, on a worldwide scale, the amount of 
economic aid allocated was remarkably consistent between administrations. Using the 
Carter administration as our referent, we found no statistically significant differences 
in the amount of aid allotted to each country among the administrations. (Apodaca 
and Stohl 1999, 195) 
In addition, after examining the motivation of the U.S. foreign assistance programs through 
the George W. Bush administration, Callaway and Matthews (2008, 63) said in their 
conclusion that all U.S. leaders have realized that “[T]he security of a nation’s people and 
territorial integrity cannot be downgraded in importance in an effort to correct another 
nation’s human suffering.” This demonstrates that human rights considerations are neither 
the only nor the primary consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign aid. 
 The other characteristic of this motivational literature is found in the research model. 
A two-step analysis of U.S. foreign aid disbursement is the most prevalent model in the 
literature (Cingranelli and Pasquerllo 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; 
Blanton 2000; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Gibler 2008). Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), 
who opened up a new research agenda, claimed that the process of U.S. aid allocation 
consists of two stages: the gatekeeping stage and the level stage. In the initial stage, the 
gatekeeping stage, the decision to grant or deny aid is considered by including both recipient 
countries and non-recipient countries, and in the second stage, the subsequent decision over 
the amount allocated is considered for recipient countries only. Looking specifically at Latin 
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American countries, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found a positive relationship 
between respect for human rights and U.S. economic aid at the second stage. Their study was 
soon called into question by Carleton and Stohl (1987) and McCormick and Mitchell (1988) 
based on sampling issues. Carleton and Stohl (1987) argued the results of Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello’s study were not robust to the exclusion of outliers. McCormick and Mitchell 
(1988) also showed that the relationship between human rights and U.S. foreign aid was 
substantially weaker when El Salvador, which was considered as an outlier in the Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello’s study, was included. Most of the disagreement occurred when the level of 
aid, at the second stage, was considered.  
 Attempting to clear up some of the ambiguities, Poe (1992) examined only economic 
aid, conducted a more inclusive statistical analysis of the two-stage aid process, and stated 
that human rights considerations were important determinants of the level of aid allocation 
during the Carter and Reagan administrations. However, Meernik, Krueger and Poe (1998) 
found that once the decision to grant aid was made, human rights conditions did not play a 
role in the amount of aid disbursed and, further, those countries with the worst human rights 
records received more aid. Although the findings of Apodaca and Stohl (1999) were more 
broadly positive on both stages, their conclusions were that human rights only mattered for 
economic aid and that human rights were not the most important consideration in U.S. aid 
allocation. More recently, Gibler (2008) found that the decision to give or deny aid was 
partly based on human rights conditions in recipient countries, but human rights records did 
not have an impact on the amount of aid distributed. Once the decision was made to grant aid, 
the amount was decided based on the need of the recipient countries (Gibler 2008). In sum, 
the existing studies ultimately demonstrate that human rights practices are not the primary 
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consideration in the distribution of U.S. foreign aid. The studies also establish that human 
rights conditions matter more at the initial stage, when determining whether to grant aid or 
not.  
Then what are the consequences of U.S. foreign aid distribution, given the fact that 
human rights conditions in potential recipient countries do not play an important role in the 
allocation of U. S. foreign aid? 
 
2.2 THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. FOREIGN AID ALLOCATION 
  The second motif in the existing literature is whether the distribution of U.S. foreign 
aid has a strong impact on human rights practices in recipient countries. As a first attempt to 
answer this question systematically, Regan (1995, 624) evaluated 32 developing countries 
from Asia and Latin America, and found that “the effectiveness of U.S. economic aid as a 
tool to shape the human rights policies of the recipient countries has been nil.” Meyer (1996), 
who used a sample of approximately 50 developing countries to examine correlations 
between multinational corporations (MNCs) and human rights levels for two years of data, 
found that while levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) had consistent, strong, and positive 
relationships, U.S. economic aid had inconsistent, weak, and positive relationships in 
predicting levels of human rights. However, in their response to the Meyer study, Smith, 
Bolyard and Ippolito (1999) showed some contradictory effects of both FDI and U.S. 
economic aid on human rights practices in recipient countries. These earlier studies were 
expanded by Richards, Gelleny and Sacko (2001), who evaluated the relationship between 
foreign economic capital and respect for human rights in 43 developing countries for the 
years 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1995. They also broadened the measure of foreign 
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economic capital by including FDI, portfolio investment, debt, and official development 
assistance, and found that “official development assistance was the only FEP [Foreign 
Economic Penetration] indicator that was not a statistically significant indicator of a 
government’s respect for either physical integrity rights or political rights and civil liberties” 
(Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001, 232).  
In contrast to most studies, Gibler (2008) argued that U.S. foreign economic aid did 
affect human rights policies in non-recipient countries but in an indirect way. He claimed that 
while the observed U.S. aid disbursements clearly had no relationship with respect for human 
rights, U.S. aid would alter human rights policies of non-recipient countries, which were not 
eligible for aid based on their human rights abuses, because they would consider their 
opportunity cost, or loss of potential income, in expectation to receive future aid (Gibler 
2008). However, in a more comprehensive study of the relationship between U.S. foreign aid 
and human rights, Callaway and Matthews (2008) found that U.S. foreign assistance had a 
deleterious effect on human rights. They included a historical overview and case studies in a 
qualitative analysis, and in a quantitative analysis they conducted pooled cross-sectional 
time-series analysis that covered the time period from 1976 to 2003 and across most nations. 
They further concluded that military aid was more detrimental to human rights conditions 
than was economic aid (Callaway and Matthews 2008). Thus, these empirical studies are 
conflicting and inconclusive regarding the consequences of U.S. foreign aid allocation on 
human rights practices in recipient countries. In sum, these contradictory findings within the 
literature show different perspectives on how human rights conditions in recipient countries 
are affected by U.S. foreign assistance.   
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
As discussed above, the first set of the literature review shows that human rights 
practices in potential recipient countries do not play an important role in the disbursement of 
U.S. foreign aid. Also, the few studies of the consequences of U.S. foreign aid show that the 
impact of U.S. foreign aid allocation on human rights conditions in aid-recipient countries is 
indeterminate.  
This research is differentiated from previous studies in two important ways. First, the 
study exclusively examines the years from 1990 to 2009, the post- Cold War era, regarding 
the consequences of U.S. foreign aid allocation in human rights conditions in 112 developing 
countries. The other is to employ two meaningful but previously neglected control variables 
– Foreign Direct Investment [FDI] and oil rents per capita – in order to incorporate the 
characteristics of economic globalization, which has accelerated with the end of the Cold 
War, into a designed model.       
The allocation of foreign aid has been influenced by both the domestic and 
international political and economic environment, while the importance of its use as a foreign 
policy tool remains unmoved. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign aid was mainly used to 
fight against the potential Soviet military threat and support allies. Containing Communism 
was the non-negotiable goal in the U.S. foreign policy before the end of the Cold War. With 
the collapse of the bipolar configuration of the Cold War, reflecting the Soviet (East, 
Communism)-U.S. (West, Democracy) confrontation, the world system has been restructured 
as well as the structure of the aid system. 
With the demise of the bipolar system, OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] countries have repeatedly stated that “the allocation of 
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foreign aid should be linked to political reform and respect for basic human rights in 
recipient countries” (Carey 2007, 447). Since foreign aid flows are the main source of 
external finance in many developing countries, Carey (2007) argued that making the aid 
allocation connected to human rights conditions in aid-recipient countries could be a 
powerful tool to improve the protection of universal human rights. Also, it has been argued 
that the United States is freed from using its foreign aid to contain Communism, and now it 
can pursue the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world by using the 
foreign aid allocation (Lai 2003). Does such political conditionality attached to aid with the 
end of Cold War influence human rights practices in aid-recipient countries? 
Aid conditionality refers to the attachment to aid of certain conditions that have to be 
met by a recipient country in order to have an aid agreement or continue to receive aid, which 
means that aid can be used “as a policy instrument to push for particular changes in 
developing countries” (Carey 2007, 449). It signifies the usefulness of aid to donor countries 
because they have the power to terminate or reduce aid in order to pursue their foreign policy 
goals (Baehr 1994). With the end of Cold War, aid conditionality has been extended from the 
economic arena to the political arena as a main concept in foreign aid. After a decade of 
economic conditionality, which pushed economic reforms (structural adjustment) in aid-
recipient countries, “the end of the Cold War, the collapse of single-party regimes, and the 
emergence of democratization movements in developing countries legitimized the use of 
political conditionality” (Carey 2007, 449). That is, aid allocations could be subject to 
conditions on human rights and democratic political processes, pushing political reforms. 
The reason that political conditionality did not surface earlier was because during the 
decolonization period, too much emphasis was placed on national sovereignty and on the 
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ideological struggle between the capitalist West and the socialist East (Burnell 1997). 
Therefore, donor countries did not push for political reforms such as human rights and 
democracy in the developing countries during the Cold War. In this context, the most 
important aspect is the end of the Cold War. With a tangible victory for the capitalist West in 
the end of the Cold War, it has now become easier for donor countries, the West, to attach 
political conditions to their aid (Carey 2007).   
These changes apparently appeared in U.S. foreign aid policies. With the end of the 
Cold War, promoting political, economic, and social transitions in former socialist bloc 
countries quickly gained prominence. Furthermore, Lancaster and Van Dusen (2005, 12) 
pointed out that: 
[T]he spread of democracy in developing countries during the 1990s – especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America – gave rise to the use of aid to promote 
democratic institutions. The many civil conflicts that persisted in Africa and 
elsewhere and caused so much death, destruction, and displacement promoted the use 
of aid not just provide relief but to support post-conflict transitions. … In all cases, 
the use of diplomacy alone could not bring about the necessary changes sought by the 
United States. Foreign aid, focused on development institutions and development 
processes, became a major tool to pursue national objectives. 
The end of the Cold War did change the direction of U.S. foreign aid allocation, from using 
its aid to contain Communism to using it to promote political reforms around the world.  
Thus, this research exclusively examines the effects of U.S. foreign aid allocation on 
human rights practices in aid-recipient countries after the end of the Cold War when political 
conditionality, meaning stipulations requiring human rights and democratic political 
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processes, has been emphasized in the distribution of foreign aid. Thus, this research 
concentrates on the human rights aspect of political conditionality, focusing on the physical 
integrity rights, which mean being free from torture, political imprisonment, disappearance, 
and extrajudicial killings.  
Two novel control variables are included in this study – FDI and oil rents per capita – 
in order to incorporate the characteristics of economic globalization in the end of the Cold 
War. Globalization, a strong international force of development around the world, has 
emerged in new international system with the demise of the Cold War. It is succinctly 
defined by McCormick (2000, 131):  
Globalization refers to the political, economic, and social forces that are drawing 
peoples together regardless of national boundaries with the end of the Cold War.  
With the force of globalization accompanied by the collapse of the Cold War, FDI has come 
to play a major role in the international economy. The most profound effect has appeared in 
developing countries, where yearly FDI flows have increased from an average of less than 
$10 billion in the 1970’s to a yearly average of less than $20 billion in the 1980’s, to explode 
in the post-Cold War era from $35.1 billion in 1990 to $115.9 billion in 1995 to $256.5 
billion in 2000 and $330.1 billion in 2005.
4
 Such a rapid increase of FDI flows captures fast-
growing economic globalization in the international system after the end of the Cold War. 
Within developing countries for their development, political and economic reforms in their 
governments have been required to accommodate more FDI. Such prerequisites for FDI 
                                                 
4
 These numbers, measured in constant dollar, are from UNCTADstat (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development), available online at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1584&lang=1. 
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encourage good governance in the governments, which may cause changes in governments’ 
policies toward human rights practices.  
Besides FDI, Oil rents have an impact on governments’ behavior according to the 
“Resource Curse” theory. “Resource curse” refers to a much-remarked-upon phenomenon 
that countries with abundant natural resources (oil, rubber, diamonds, and minerals) often 
underperform economically relative to those without such resources. In common sense, 
countries with rich endowments of natural resources should be prosperous; yet, relevant 
studies have shown that countries with abundant natural resources have been negatively 
associated with economic progress (Sachs and Warner 2001). In fact, exporting natural 
resources produces tangible revenues for a state. However, such large windfall revenues 
influence the government’s behavior, with its national politics extremely focused on grabbing 
the rents earned by natural resources, making public-good production inefficient (Lane and 
Tornell 1995). After the end of the Cold War, with the force of economic globalization, such 
government behaviors – rent seeking and corruption – were identified as the main reasons for 
poor economic performances in developing countries. This makes it difficult for a country 
with abundant natural resources to be accepted as a qualified aid recipient when good 
governance became a crucial parameter for successfully receiving development assistance.  
Political conditionality attached to aid, pushing political reforms such as human rights 
and democracy, with the force of economic globalization requiring good governance, may 
encourage improvement of governments’ behaviors toward human rights in developing 
countries. With changes in the international political and economic system as well as the 
structure of aid system after the end of the Cold War, the study anticipates that the allocation 
16 
 
of U.S. foreign aid [economic, military and total aid] is positively associated with respect for 
physical integrity rights in developing countries.  
  
17 
 
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 DEFINING AND MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS, 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 Vasak (1977) categorized universal human rights into three subcategories: first, 
second, and third generation rights. First-generation rights are civil and political rights. Such 
rights mainly deal with personal liberties and protecting an individual’s rights from a 
country’s violations. The first-generation rights include the right to life and equality, the right 
of freedom to exercise religion and speech, the rights not to be tortured or killed, the rights to 
be protected from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to assemble into political parties, 
and the right to vote in fair elections (Findley, et al. 2010). Second-generation rights are 
social, economic, and cultural rights.  These rights concern the basic necessities of life, which 
include the right to employment, private property, education, and healthcare.  Third-
generation rights are those rights that go beyond the first- and second-generation rights, 
mainly based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  The third generation 
rights include the right to self-determination, development, a healthy environment, and 
participation in common heritage (Vasak 1997).  
This research focuses on a critical subset of human rights, physical integrity rights, 
which is an individual’s fundamental rights that protect individuals from torture, extrajudicial 
killing, disappearance, and political imprisonment from arbitrary power of the state (Findley, 
et al. 2010). Physical integrity rights are mainly considered in the research because their 
violation offends the widely shared norms of appropriate government conduct for basic 
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human rights. This study specifically examines how physical integrity rights in recipient 
countries are affected by the distribution of U.S. foreign aid.
5
   
There are three common measures of government human rights practices used in 
studies of human rights and foreign aid. All of these measures are standards-based measures 
that construct a set of human right criteria for different levels and then use these criteria to 
rate governments’ human rights practices (Callaway and Matthews 2008). The first common 
measure is the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties, which are mainly 
derived from the UDHR. It rates states based on the extent that their governments provide 
citizens with political rights and civil liberties, using a seven point ordinal scale for each 
category of rights (political and civil). However, Capellán and Gomez (2007) point out that 
most human rights researchers consider the Freedom House measure as an indicator of 
democracy rather than of human rights. 
Another common measure of human rights is the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) 
human rights index.
6
 The CIRI human rights dataset contains “both disaggregated measures 
of specific human rights practices, which can either be analyzed separately or combined into 
valid and reliable indices, as well as two already-aggregated indices” (CIRI Human Rights 
Data Project 2011). From the CIRI dataset, four common individual human rights scores are 
included for physical integrity rights. They are torture, extrajudicial killing, political 
imprisonment, and disappearance. Their coding index is based on a nine-point scale ranging 
from 0 (absolutely no respect for rights) to 8 (full respect for rights) (Cingranelli and 
Richards 2011).  
                                                 
5
 Physical integrity rights are also referred in the literature as personal integrity rights, life integrity rights, and 
security rights. 
6
 The dataset is available online at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/myciri/my_ciri_login.asp. 
19 
 
Finally, the third common measure of government human-rights practices is the 
Political Terror Scale (PTS).
7
 Unlike the previous measure, the PTS has a five-category scale 
which is designed to measure physical integrity rights. It captures political terrors such as 
torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and threats against relatives occurring 
within a state (Callaway and Matthews 2008). Both the CIRI and the PTS measure are based 
on the yearly reports of governmental human rights practices from the U.S. State Department 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International’s Annual Reports for 
each country. However, while the CIRI rankings are measured in terms of government 
respect for human rights, the PTS is constructed in terms of government violations of human 
rights. That is, higher values of the CIRI indicate a better situation for human rights, while 
higher values of the PTS measure indicate worse human rights. 
 For this research, since both the CIRI and the PTS human rights measure can be 
strong indicators of physical integrity rights, both measures are utilized to examine the 
impact of U.S. foreign aid on human rights conditions in recipient countries during the post 
Cold-War years from 1990 to 2009.  
 
4.2 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.2.1 U.S. FOREIGN AID, THE KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLE 
 The key explanatory variable is U.S. foreign aid per capita rates using constant 2009 
dollar amounts. This research focuses, first, on U.S. economic and military assistance 
separately and, second, on the total U.S. foreign assistance, and their respective effects on 
                                                 
7
 The dataset is available online at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. 
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human rights conditions in 112 developing countries.
8
 The data is taken from U.S. Overseas 
and Loans and Grants, U.S. Bureau of Census International Database, commonly known as 
the Greenbook, provided annually by the USAID.
9
 As discussed above, with changes in the 
structure of aid allocation due to the end of the Cold War, it is expected that U.S. foreign aid 
has a positive impact on governments’ practices for physical integrity rights in recipient 
countries. The variables [U.S. economic, military, and total aid] are transformed with a 
natural logarithm to normalize their distributions. 
 The aid variables are lagged at one year in order to eliminate the potential impact of 
reverse causality in a designed model. There is no conclusive discussion in the earlier 
literature regarding how long foreign aid takes to affect human rights conditions in recipient 
countries. Regan’s (1995) study used a one-year lag, while the Meyer (1996, 1998) studies 
and the Callaway and Matthews (2008) study included a three-year lag in their empirical 
models. Regan (1995) reasoned that using a lag of more than one year could make the causal 
inference more difficult and raise the cost of losing data. Since this research examines the 
post-Cold War period, merely 20 years, a one-year lag is chosen for the model.
10
  
                                                 
8
 Developing countries include low-income and middle-income countries, measured and grouped by the World 
Bank. Myanmar (Burma) and Somalia are the only two countries dropped from the data due to the lack of data 
availability. The income groups are: low income, $995 or less; lower middle income, $996 - $3,945; and upper 
middle income, $3,946 - $12,195. This data is available online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog. Also, 
the list of developing countries is shown in Appendix A. 
9
 The data is available online at http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/about/.  
10
 However, the models with lag of two and three years were also preformed, and the direction of the regression 
coefficients of foreign aid [economic, military and total aid] remained the same as the model with a lag of one 
year. 
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4.2.2 THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
A number of control variables are included in this research in order to discern the 
relationship between U.S. foreign aid allocation and human rights conditions.
11
 These control 
variables are the level of democracy, leftist government, GDP per capita, FDI, oil rents per 
capita, population size, international and internal armed conflict, and British colonial 
heritage, which may independently influence human rights practices in aid-recipient 
countries. According to the individual variables’ characteristics, the control variables are 
categorized into two different groups.  The level of democracy, leftist government, and 
international and internal armed conflicts fall into the category of political/strategic 
explanation variables.  GDP per capita, oil rents per capita, FDI, and population size are 
socioeconomic explanation variables.  
 
Political/Strategic explanation variable: The level of democracy   
 In the literature, the level of democracy is positively associated with human rights 
conditions (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Cingranelli and 
Richards 1999; Callaway and Matthews 2008). The more democratic a country is, the less the 
country is abusive to citizens. Democracy is thought to empower people in a regime while 
reducing their government oppression, and thus the empowered citizens are able to fight 
against any forms of violations exercised by their government (Cingranelli and Richards 
                                                 
11
 A dummy variable, British colonial heritage, that was positively associated with human rights practices in the 
earlier literature, was considered for inclusion among the control variables. However, since this was based on 
the thought that British colonial influence is strongly associated with the development of democracy and 
democratic ideas (see Mitchell and McCormick 1988), which are measured directly here, this variable was 
omitted later. Also, the number of international NGOs’ activities was considered as other control variable in 
order to examine their impact on a country’s human rights practices. But due to the lack of available panel data, 
this must be left to a future study.   
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1999). The end of the Cold War promoted the spread of democracy in the globe, especially 
among the nations where the Soviets’ involvement and influence were diminished 
(Cingranelli and Richards 1999). A greater number of democratic regimes was expected to 
arise in the new international order established owing to the demise of the Cold War. The 
Polity IV measure of democracy is employed for this research since the Freedom House 
measure is correlated with the human rights measures as mentioned in the above section 
4.1.
12
 The Polity IV democracy ratings emphasize “the institutional attributes of democracy 
rather than actions of the states” (Callaway and Matthews 2008, 88). This measure of 
democracy is based on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 (the least democratic) to 10 (the 
most democratic).
13
 
 
 Political/Strategic explanation variable: Leftist government   
 This control variable is about regime ideology, specifically the presence of a leftist 
government. The measure of leftist government is employed from the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI). The DPI defines and refers to “Left” governments as “communist, 
socialist, or social democratic” governments while “Right” governments as “conservative or 
Christian democratic” governments. This variable is coded 1 for a “Right” regime, 2 for a 
“Central” regime, and 3 for “Left” regime (Beck et al. 2001). Findings about the impact of 
leftist government on human rights have conflicting results. Poe and Tate (1994) found that 
                                                 
12
 The Polity IV dataset is from Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Data Page, and is 
available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. 
13
 Polity, an alternative measure of democracy, is also commonly used. Polity measures difference between 
institutionalized democracy (0-10) and institutionalized autocracy (0-10), which both are derived from coding 
of competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. See the Polity IV Project Dataset Users’ Manual, 
available only at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf. For this study, the democracy 
measure is used to capture “institutionalized democracy.”  
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leftist government was statistically significant, with a positive coefficient, in analysis using 
the State Department measure while statistically insignificant, with a negative coefficient, in 
the model based on Amnesty International Reports. However, in a follow-up article, Poe, 
Tate, and Keith (1999) found that regardless of the source of independent variable, the 
presence of leftist government was less associated with personal integrity abuse. After the 
Cold War, this might be different. The demise of the Soviet Union enables countries with a 
leftist ideology, especially the socialist bloc, to interact with Western regimes, and thus the 
oppressive behaviors of these leftist governments might change.   
 
Political/Strategic explanation variable: International and internal armed conflict       
 Earlier studies suggest that the presence of either international armed conflict and/or 
armed internal conflict has a detrimental impact on physical integrity rights (Poe and Tate 
1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Callaway and Matthews 
2008). In general, it is difficult to consider human rights in times of conflict because a 
government more likely wants to use repressive means to fight its opposition in order to 
maintain its power. One corollary of the post-Cold War breakup of the Soviet Union was the 
increase in interstate and intrastate conflicts among and within the newly formed states. With 
the increase of such conflicts, a corresponding increase in human rights violation was 
expected (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). The UCDP [Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program]/PRIO [Peace Research Institute, Oslo] dataset in version 4-2009 is employed to 
indicate the presence of armed conflict in states. In the UCDP/PRIO dataset, the armed 
conflict includes four types of conflict: extrasystemic, interstate (international), internal, and 
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internationalized internal armed conflict.
14
 This variable is coded 0 if there is no international 
or internal armed conflict present in a given year and 1 if there is. 
 
Socioeconomic explanation variable: GDP [Gross Domestic Product] per capita   
 Previous research shows that economic development was negatively associated with a 
government’s human rights (Henderson 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 
1994; Neumayer 2005). Mitchell and McCormick (1988, 478) found that economic 
development had a negative impact on human rights practices in developing countries 
because to develop while maintaining control, poor countries, where “substantial social and 
political tensions created by economic scarcity” already existed, were more apt to use 
repression on their citizens. The end of the Cold War reinforced such impact. Growing 
economic globalization with the demise of the Cold War created a great deal of pressure on 
the Eastern-bloc and Third World countries to establish themselves and on their economies to 
compete in the new international system. Real GDP per capita (constant price: chain series) 
is employed from Penn World Table, created by the Center for International Comparisons at 
the University of Pennsylvania.
15
 Due to the skewed nature of income distribution, figures of 
GDP per capita are logged.  
  
  
                                                 
14
 According to the UCDP/PRIO dataset codebook, extrasystemic armed conflict is defined as a conflict 
between a state and non-state group(s) outside its own territory, interstate armed conflict is between states, 
intrastate (internal) armed conflict is between a state and internal opposition group(s), and internationalized 
internal armed conflict is between a state and internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states. 
This data is available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/.  
15
 The Penn World Table provides purchasing power parity and national income accounts for 188 countries for 
the years 1950-2004. This data is available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. 
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 Socioeconomic explanation variable: FDI [Foreign Direct Investment]   
 Kim and Trumbore (2010) studied the relationship between “one aspect of economic 
globalization” and human rights conditions. They used FDI, specifically transnational 
mergers and acquisitions, as one aspect of economic globalization, and found that FDI has a 
positive relationship with physical integrity rights, empowerment rights, workers’ rights, and 
women’s economic rights especially in developing countries (Kim and Trumbore 2010). 
With the force of economic globalization, the end of the Cold War might enhance such 
relationship by encouraging good governance to accommodate more FDI. The variable is 
taken from UNCTADstat provided by United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).
16
 This research employs the natural logarithm of FDI figures in 
Inward and outward foreign direct investment stock, annual, 1980-2009. 
   
Socioeconomic explanation variable: Oil rents per capita     
 Ross (2008) argued in his article, “Oil, Islam, and Women,” that gender inequality in 
Middle East had much to do the oil-based economy, but relatively little to do with Islam. 
Based on earlier studies of the “resource curse” and his new findings, he claimed that oil not 
only hinders democracy but also broadens the gender inequality gap in a society (Ross 
2008).
17
 Oil-production tends to remove incentives to reform, and oil-producing countries 
care less about improving individual rights as they fight to control resource rents (Harford 
and Klein 2005). With the force of economic globalization with the demise of the Cold War, 
the curse of oil might continue to have its influence over many oil-producing countries. Ross 
                                                 
16
 This data is available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=5742&lang=1. 
17
 “Resource curse” is explained in Chapter 3. 
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(2008) calculated oil rents per capita, a country’s total rents from oil and gas (i.e., the value 
of production minus the county-specific extraction costs, including the cost of capital) 
divided by its midyear population.
18
 The logged oil rents per capita are utilized for this 
research. 
 
Socioeconomic explanation variable: Population size           
 Population size has had an impact on human rights conditions in previous studies 
(Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Callaway and Matthews 
2008). Henderson (1991) developed an argument that as the level of population increased, 
government tendencies to use repression to manage the pressure on resource allocation also 
increased. Given the fact that the distribution of world population is skewed, this research 
uses the logged total national population obtained from the World Bank.
19
 
 
4.3 HYPOTHESES 
 The primary purpose of this research is to measure the impact of U.S. foreign aid 
[economic, military, and total assistance] on human rights [physical integrity rights] practices 
during the post-Cold War period in aid-receiving developing countries, which makes the 
primary hypothesis. In addition, in order to obtain further insight in this relationship, 
secondary hypotheses regarding control variables are stated to examine the impact of each 
control variable on human rights practices in recipient countries. The hypotheses are as 
follows: 
                                                 
18
 This data is from Michael L. Ross Dataverse, and available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross. The 
data is available for 169 countries for the years from 1960 to 2006. 
19
 This data is available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. 
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Primary Hypothesis 
 Key Explanatory Variable 
H1: U.S. foreign aid [economic, military, and total aid] has a positive impact 
on physical integrity rights practices in developing countries during the 
post-Cold War period, ceteris paribus. 
 
Secondary Hypotheses  
 Political/Strategic Explanation Variables 
H2: The greater the level of democracy in a country, the more likely that 
country respects physical integrity rights in aid-receiving developing 
countries during the post-Cold War period, ceteris paribus. 
 
H3: With the end of the Cold War, leftist governments are positively 
associated with physical integrity rights, ceteris paribus. 
 
H4: The presence of international and internal armed conflicts in a country is 
negatively associated with respect for physical integrity rights during the 
post-Cold War period in developing countries, ceteris paribus. 
 
 Socioeconomic Explanation Variables 
H5: GDP per capita, as an indicator of economic development in developing 
countries, is negatively correlated with respect for physical integrity 
rights during the post-Cold War period, ceteris paribus. 
 
H6: A high level of FDI is positively associated with respect for physical 
integrity rights during the post-Cold War period in developing countries, 
ceteris paribus. 
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H7: Oil rents per capita in developing countries are negatively correlated with 
respect for physical integrity rights during the post-Cold War period, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
H8: A high level of population is negatively associated with respect for 
physical integrity rights in aid-receiving developing countries during the 
post-Cold War period, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.4 PCTS DATA AND OLS REGRESSION MODEL 
 This research utilizes Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to assess pooled 
cross-sectional time series (PCTS) data for 112 developing countries over a 20-year period, 
from 1990 to 2009.
20
 There are some statistical challenges to analyzing PCTS data with OLS 
regression. Besides a general problem, multicollinearity, PCTS are not only susceptible to 
autocorrelation due to the time series nature of the data but also to heteroskedasticity because 
of the cross-national, spatial, nature of the data (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). The main reason 
for this study employing an OLS regression model is that the bias in results using PCTS data 
is associated “with the error terms, or residuals, and not the coefficients” (Callaway and 
Matthews 2008, 93). In addition, previous studies that examined the relationship between 
U.S. foreign aid and human rights used OLS regressions to analyze panel data (Poe and Tate 
1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Callaway and Matthews 2008).  
Multicollinearity refers to a strong correlation between independent variables, which 
makes none of them have unique explanatory power to predict the dependent variable 
                                                 
20
 The statistical analyses for this study are conducted with Stata 9.2 (Stata Corporation) statistical software 
package. 
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(Agresti and Finlay 2009). To test for the presence of multicollinearity, a correlation matrix 
was generated for the independent variables. Correlation exceeding 0.6 or greater indicates 
the presence of multicollinearity and requires further investigation (Bohrnstedt and Knoke 
1994). The generated correlation matrix for the independent variables of this research 
suggests that there is no need to have concern regarding multicollinearity among the 
independent variables.
21
 Heteroskedasticity, on the other hand, refers to a violation of the 
basic assumption of linear regression in which the error term is assumed to be homoskedastic 
– constant across observations.  The presence of heteroskedasticity may bias estimates of 
standard errors for the regression coefficients and thus produce misleading results (Lewis-
Beck 1980). A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was conducted to detect the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in each model in the study. All models narrowly passed the 
heteroskedasticity test.
22
 Finally, like heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation refers to a violation 
of the assumption that the errors are uncorrelated and independent, and when it is present, 
estimates of standard errors for the regression coefficients are reduced and, thus, also 
produce misleading parameter estimates for the model (Ostrom 1990). Consequently, Prais-
Winsten regressions, in which an AR (1) specification is included in the regression in order 
to correct autocorrelation, are employed, while panel-corrected standard errors are utilized to 
correct the heteroskedastic error terms (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). 
  The empirical model of physical integrity rights is represented by a multiple 
regression equation expressed as a linear function of the independent variable, U.S. foreign 
aid, and control variables. The designed model for this research is outlined as follows: 
                                                 
21
 A summary of the data and the correlation matrix are provided in Appendix B and C. None of the correlations 
among independent variables is 0.6 or greater.  
22
 The chi-square test for heteroskedasticity was performed by using Stata’s hettest procedure.  
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Government Violation/Respect for Physical Integrity Rightsti = a 
+ β1 U.S. Foreign Aid [Economic, Military, and Total Aid] Per Capita(t-1)i  
+ β2 Democracyti + β3 Leftist Governmentti + β4 Armed Conflictti 
+ β5 GDP Per Capitati + β6 FDIti + β7 Oil Rents Per Capitati + β8 Population Sizeti + eti  
Where:   
ti  = country i at time t 
a = intercept for equation 
βn  = regression coefficient for variable n 
eti = error term for country i at time t 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
The results from the PCTS analysis on the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and 
physical integrity rights in 112 developing countries during the post-Cold War period, 1990 
to 2009, are presented in Table 2. Model A, B, and C represent the economic aid, military aid, 
and total aid models respectively for all countries in the sample. Each model includes two 
different human rights measures– (1) the CIRI human rights indicator and (2) the PTS. In all 
regressions, the parameter of the Wald chi-square test is highly significant, which indicates 
the model as a whole is significantly different than zero. The R-squared is between 0.43 and 
0.45, which indicates about 44 percent of the dependent variable is explained by the variation 
in the independent variables. The rho parameters confirm serial correlation as a problem in 
the data.  
Since the CIRI indicator measures a government’s respect for physical integrity rights, 
while the PTS measures a government’s violation of physical integrity rights, the direction of 
the regression coefficients of the two, (1) and (2), should be opposite, and that is shown 
consistently in the results regardless of the models. However, the CIRI human rights measure 
is used as a basis to explain the estimated regression coefficients because interpreting high 
values in the scale as better human rights seems intuitive.   
All the key explanatory variables, U.S. economic, military, and total foreign aid, after 
controlling for the political/strategic and socioeconomic factors, have a negative impact on 
physical integrity rights in developing countries during the post-Cold War years from 1990 to 
2009. The coefficients for economic aid (Model A(1)), military aid (Model B(1)), and total 
aid (Model C(1)) indicate that one unit increase of foreign aid decreases the respect for 
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physical integrity rights by 0.139, 0.037, and 0.132 respectively.
23
 While economic aid and 
total aid are statistically significant in Model A and Model C, military aid is not significant in 
Model B. Although these results are supportive of the critics’ perspective regarding the effect 
of foreign assistance on human rights conditions (Callaway and Matthews 2008), the results 
are against the primary hypothesis of this study that during the post- Cold War period, U.S. 
foreign aid is positively associated with human rights conditions in aid-receiving developing 
countries. 
Turning to the political/strategic explanation variables, democracy is statistically 
significant in all models, and has a positive impact on the realization of physical integrity 
rights during the 20-year period of the post-Cold War, which is accordance with the 
expectation. Leftist government, however, is negatively associated with physical integrity 
rights and is statistically significant only in Model A(1) and Model C(1), which is against the 
third hypothesis of the study. This is also contrary to the findings by Callaway and Matthews 
(2008), who examined the relationship between U.S. aid and human rights for the years from 
1976 to 2006. The strongest predictor within the political/strategic explanation variables is 
the presence of armed conflicts, including both international and internal armed conflicts, in 
the post-Cold War era. It has the largest coefficients, in absolute value, in each model, and is 
also statistically significant in all regressions (p values in all models are virtually equal to 
zero), regardless of the type of aid. When the presence of armed conflicts, the level of respect 
for physical integrity rights decreases by 1.95 in Model A(1), 1.96 in Model B(1), and 1.94 in 
                                                 
23
 Although the allocation of military aid seems to have a much lesser negative impact on physical integrity 
rights by simply looking at the coefficients, this is misleading, because the amount of total military aid is 
approximately a quarter of each of total economic aid and total aid. 
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Model C(1), which confirms that countries with violent conflicts are more likely to decrease 
in respect for physical integrity rights, as stated in the fourth hypothesis. 
The remaining control variables are socioeconomic explanation variables. GDP per 
capita, as an indicator of the level of economic development, is negatively associated with 
physical integrity rights during the post-Cold War years, as hypothesized. Its relationship 
with physical integrity rights is statistically significant except in Model B(1).  Unlike 
findings from the previous study by Kim and Trumbore (2010), who examined the impact of 
FDI on human rights for the years from 1981-2006, FDI has a negative impact on human 
rights conditions in developing countries during the post-Cold War period. The level of FDI 
is insignificant statistically in all models and also against the sixth hypothesis. It does not 
seem that FDI flows encourage governments in developing countries to establish good 
governance, which may cause changes in governments’ policies toward human rights 
practices. Turning to other socioeconomic explanation variables, oil rents per capita is also 
negatively associated with physical integrity rights in recipient countries, but as expected. 
Fighting over resource rents negatively affects a government’s human rights practices. One 
curious result is that its impact on human rights is statistically significant in the models with 
the CIRI indicator, Models A(1), B(1), and C(1), but not in those with the PTS , Models A(2), 
B(2), and C(2). Finally, population size is statistically significant in all estimations (p values 
in all models are less than 0.05). As hypothesized in H8, a higher level of population is 
associated with a lower level of respect for physical integrity rights in this sample. 
Population size is the strongest predictor within the socioeconomic explanatory variables 
with the regression coefficients of -0.587, -0.548, and -0.588, saying that as logged 
34 
 
population increases by one unit, the level of respect for physical integrity rights decrease by 
slightly over half a point in the models using the CIRI indicator. 
Table 2. The Impact of U.S. Foreign Aid on Physical Integrity Rights, 1990-2009 
Independent Variables 
Model A Model B Model C 
(1) CIRI (2) PTS (1) CIRI (2) PTS (1) CIRI (2) PTS 
Economic Aid(t-1) -0.139* 0.075*     
 (0.057) (0.033)     
Military Aid(t-1)   -0.037 0.069   
   (0.088) (0.046)   
Total Aid(t-1)     -0.132* 0.078* 
     (0.058) (0.033) 
Democracy 0.112** -0.058** 0.108** -0.056** 0.112** -0.058** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
Leftist Government -0.136* 0.026 -0.127 0.020 -0.139* 0.028 
 (0.069) (0.037) (0.072) (0.377) (0.069) (0.037) 
Armed Conflicts -1.949** 0.693** -1.956** 0.687** -1.942** 0.693** 
 (0.188) (0.103) (0.189) (0.102) (0.187) (0.101) 
GDP per Capita (ln) -0.119* 0.057* -0.104 0.048* -0.117* 0.057* 
 (0.052) (0.023) (0.055) (0.225) (0.052) (0.022) 
FDI (ln) -0.047 0.036 -0.050 0.035 -0.044 0.034 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) 
Oil Rent per Capita (ln) -0.116** 0.012 -0.106** 0.007 -0.115** 0.012 
 (0.028) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.278) (0.016) 
Population (ln) -0.587** 0.264** -0.547** 0.250** -0.588** 0.266** 
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.041) (0.031) 
Constant 15.662** -2.240** 14.695** -1.821** 15.634** -2.273** 
 (0.646) (0.527) (0.601) (0.481) (0.641) (0.525) 
       
No. of Observations 828 848 828 848 828 848 
No. of Countries 112 112 112 112 112 112 
R-Squared 0.439 0.440 0.434 0.438 0.439 0.441 
Wald chi-square 1538.64 382.08 1387.85 392.67 1519.80 404.83 
Rho 0.377 0.576 0.383 0.585 0.375 0.570 
Note: Models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression with correction for serial autocorrelation 
within panels (assumed first-order process) and heteroskedastic disturbances between them (using Stata’s xtpcse 
procedure). Estimates are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in 
parentheses. The null hypothesis of the Wald chi-square test is that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero.     
*p < .05. **p < .01. In addition, the robustness of the models is tested by serially omitting each control variable. 
All models with the PTS seem robust, while models with the CIRI indicator seem a little sensitive to the test: 
the direction of the coefficient on the key explanatory variable changes when population, the control variable, is 
removed from the regressions.  
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
 This research attempts to examine the effects of U.S. foreign aid on human rights 
conditions in recipient countries during the post-Cold War era by utilizing pooled cross-
sectional time series data on 112 developing countries from 1990-2009. Since none of the 
studies that have examined the consequences of U.S. foreign aid exclusively did so for the 
post-Cold War years, this research is designed to accomplish such a goal. Furthermore, the 
end of the Cold War is recognized as an unprecedented event that has a profound impact on 
the international political and economic system as well as domestic configurations. The 
collapse of the Cold War also changes the structure of foreign aid system, in which donor 
countries, including the United States, now start to attach political conditions to their foreign 
aid, pushing political reforms. Such changes in foreign aid allocation make it possible to 
expect a positive impact of U.S. foreign aid on human rights practices in aid-receiving 
developing countries during the post-Cold War era. However, the findings of the study are 
not supportive of the primary hypothesis. Rather, the analysis shows that the distribution of 
U.S. foreign aid [economic, military and total aid] has a detrimental impact on physical 
integrity rights in developing countries in the post-Cold War period of 1990-2009. This 
unexpected result allows a different perspective on the U.S. foreign aid and human rights 
policy.  
 “The allocation of foreign aid is influenced by the evolving, continuing, and 
paradoxical values, ideals, and beliefs of the various policy makers” (Apodaca 2006, xiii). 
Even though, as a result of the end of the Cold War, the world system has been restructured 
and thus the structure of aid system has been changed, the reformulation of priorities for 
foreign assistance and the degree of commitment to the human rights policy by U.S. 
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administrations in the post-Cold War period might not be much different than in the Cold 
War era. 
 George H. W. Bush’s presidency coincided with an era of immense changes in world 
politics with the passing of the Cold War. The Bush Sr. administration had the opportunity to 
implement American ideals of human rights and democracy and also the support of Congress 
to redefine U.S. foreign policy. In fact, Congress successfully redirected U.S. foreign aid to 
support the transition of the former Soviet satellite countries.
24
 However, “Bush mismanaged 
the opportunity to redirect America’s foreign policy toward human rights concerns due to his 
renowned lack of vision and his desire to remain convivial with foreign nations regardless of 
their human rights records” (Apodaca 2006, 134). 
 Clinton came to office with the promise, made during his campaign for president, that 
human rights would finally be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, which was strongly 
reminiscent of the Carter administration (McCormick 2000). With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the traditional rationales for aid were no longer valid. For the new purposes of U.S. 
aid distribution, “USAID emphasized the direct economic benefits to the United States when 
pushing for foreign aid allocation from Congress” (Apodaca 2006, 156). Enhancing U.S. 
commercial interests became the primary foreign policy goal of the Clinton administration. 
“Thus, despite Clinton’s rhetoric heralding the importance of human rights, policies during 
his two terms in office failed to live up to his claims. Instead of making human rights 
promotion a cornerstone of his foreign policy, Clinton was willing to forgo improvements in 
                                                 
24
 Congress passed the East European Democracy Act (SEED; PL 101-513) and the Freedom Support Act (PL 
102-511). However, due to the federal deficits, these new programs made the amount of foreign aid to Latin  
America, Asia, and Africa be reduced. 
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human condition for economic and political gains,” which is reminiscent of Carter’s paradox 
(Callaway and Matthews 2008, 60-61). 
 With the terrorist September 11 attacks, the United States once again had an enemy. 
Unlike the enemy of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, or Communism, the post-September 11 
enemy was a more ambiguous entity, “evil.” With the tragedy of the September 11 attacks, 
the use of foreign aid increased because the George W. Bush administration had a clear 
purpose for aid, namely to fight the war on terrorism. However, the respect for human rights, 
both internationally and domestically, decreased. While foreign aid was clearly recognized as 
an effective tool of U.S. foreign policy under the Bush Jr. administration, “it [was] not used 
as leverage to entice improvement in human rights conditions. In fact, it is given with no 
strings attached to some of the most egregious violations of human rights worldwide in the 
name of national security” (Callaway and Matthews 2008, 63). 
 As discussed above, the collapse of the Cold War was a chance for the United States 
to promote universal human rights, since the traditional realpolitik rationale for foreign aid 
allocation was absent and political conditionality had emerged among the developed, donor, 
countries. However, rhetoric aside, promoting human rights in the world never became a 
major concern of U.S. foreign aid allocation in the post-Cold War period. It has always been 
secondary in the list of U.S. foreign-policy goals. Some of the consequences of aid allocation 
have drawn attention of the world. With recent unrest in Middle East, U.S. foreign policy has 
been the target of criticism over its long support of authoritarian regimes, which are the 
center of civic uprisings in Middle East. These criticisms are especially pointed over 
America’s weakness in pressing such regimes because of their role in national political 
interests. Egypt is one prominent example.   
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 While Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General, criticized about the situation in Egypt 
that attacks on demonstrators were not acceptable, the White House, after asking for restraint 
in anti-government protestors for over a week, announced that the president “deplored” the 
violence against peaceful protesters in Egypt
25
 (MediaCorp 2011). Apodaca (2006, 184) 
explained that “[T]he human rights violations in Egypt, similar to many others perpetrated in 
the pro-American countries of the Middle East, were no longer an important issue when the 
U.S. foreign policy of Middle Eastern friendship and stability was concerned.” 
 For the post-Cold War period, U.S. foreign aid had a negative impact on human rights 
conditions in aid-receiving developing countries. Repeated rhetoric notwithstanding, the lack 
of implementation in the U.S. human rights policy seems clear when examined via the 
different presidential administrations above. This is also accordance with the empirical study 
of Apodaca and Stohl (1999). U.S. leaders’ emphasis on the importance of human rights in 
their rhetoric does not guarantee implementation of the policies that advance human rights 
protections in the face of realpolitik. Implementation seems a very important key to achieve 
such a goal in realpolitik. 
  
                                                 
25
 Egypt, which became the second-largest recipient of America aid in 1979 after it agreed to make peace with 
Israel, receives around $1.5 billion in military aid from Washington each year. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
With the end of the Cold War, the major rationale for U.S. foreign aid, to contain 
Communism, seemed lost. With the new world order, the expectation of promoting 
ideological values such as democracy and human rights seemed well-founded.  Such 
expectation is attached to the allocation of foreign aid as the name of political conditionality, 
which emphasized political reforms in recipient countries as a prerequisite for receiving aid.  
However, the empirical findings of this research suggested that U.S. foreign aid, regardless 
of the type of aid, had a detrimental impact on citizens’ physical integrity rights in 112 aid-
receiving developing countries during the post-Cold War period of 1990-2009. In short, the 
consequences of U.S. foreign aid distribution is associated with poor human rights conditions. 
As an effort to find reasons, the studies of human rights considerations in the presidential 
administration in the post-Cold War years are reviewed. In sum, as an effective tool of the 
U.S. foreign policy, foreign aid has been used to accomplish the national interest such as 
furthering commercial objectives and the war on terrorism rather than promoting universal 
human rights. Even though the good will of the chief administrators to promote human rights 
is explicit, faithful implementation to achieve such a goal through foreign aid always falls far 
short of their promises.     
The results of this study have provided additional insight into the relationship 
between U.S. foreign aid and human rights. More importantly, it has illustrated the effects of 
U.S. foreign aid on human rights during the post-Cold War period. Pushing political reforms 
by attaching political conditionality to aid, which was driven by the end of the Cold War, did 
not change the negative impact of U.S. foreign aid on human rights conditions in developing 
countries. Then, the question in terms of future research is what other factors after the end of 
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the Cold War influence this relationship. One prominent phenomenon that draws attention to 
this relationship is nongovernmental organizations’ (or NGOs’) involvement in securing 
universal human rights in the international community. Furthermore, NGOs’ activities 
supported by bilateral or multilateral aid of developed countries may lead down to change 
human rights conditions in developing countries. This is left for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
     Countries included in study 
Low Income Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income 
Afghanistan Angola Algeria 
Bangladesh Armenia Algeria 
Benin Bhutan Argentina 
Burundi Bolivia Azerbaijan 
Cambodia Cameroon Belarus 
Central African Republic China Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Chad Congo, Republic of Botswana 
Comoros Cote d’Ivoire Brazil 
Eritrea Djibouti Bulgaria 
Ethiopia Ecuador Chile 
Gambia Egypt Colombia 
Ghana El Salvador Costa Rica 
Guinea Georgia Cuba 
Guinea-Bissau Guatemala Dominican Republic 
Haiti Guyana Fiji 
Kenya Honduras Gabon 
Kyrgyz Republic India Iran 
Laos Indonesia Jamaica 
Liberia Iraq Kazakhstan 
Madagascar Jordan Lebanon 
Malawi Lesotho Libya 
Mali Moldova Lithuania 
Mauritania Mongolia Macedonia 
Mozambique Morocco Malaysia 
Nepal Nicaragua Mauritius 
Niger Nigeria Mexico 
Rwanda Pakistan Namibia 
Sierra Leone Papua New Guinea Panama 
Solomon Islands Paraguay Peru 
Tajikistan Philippines Romania 
Tanzania Senegal Russia 
Togo Sri Lanka South Africa 
Uganda Sudan Turkey 
Zambia Swaziland Uruguay 
Zimbabwe Syria Venezuela 
 
Thailand   
 
Tunisia   
 
Turkmenistan   
 
Ukraine   
 
Uzbekistan   
 
Vietnam   
 
Yemen   
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APPENDIX B 
Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CIRI 2121 4.022 2.074 0 8 
PTS 2206 2.910 0.986 1 5 
Econ Aid (ln) 2240 1.474 1.130 0 5.832 
Milt Aid (ln) 2240 0.310 0.694 0 5.401 
Total Aid (ln) 2240 1.556 1.161 0 6.046 
Democracy 2170 4.105 3.587 0 10 
Leftist Gov’t 1115 2.283 0.905 1 3 
Armed Conflicts 2240 0.204 0.403 0 1 
GDP (ln) 2205 7.763 1.162 0.289 9.895 
FDI (ln) 2109 7.268 2.205 0.131 13.105 
Oil Rents (ln) 1904 1.814 2.435 0 8.408 
Population (ln) 2240 16.145 1.510 12.656 21.010 
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Econ Aid 1 
         
Milt Aid 
 
1 
        
Total Aid 
  
1 
       
Democracy 0.079 -0.001 0.085 1 
      
Leftist Gov’t -0.074 -0.129 -0.098 -0.355 1 
     
Armed Conflict 0.005 -0.028 0.004 -0.188 0.022 1 
    
GDP -0.119 0.125 -0.087 0.325 -0.236 -0.204 1 
   
FDI -0.135 0.114 -0.099 0.245 -0.129 -0.168 0.454 1 
  
Oil Rents -0.296 -0.038 -0.288 -0.179 0.106 0.024 0.240 0.413 1 
 
Population -0.256 -0.051 -0.247 -0.015 0.003 0.140 0.074 0.582 0.372 1 
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